The Fifth Auxiliary Right (book review) by Diamond, Raymond T. & Cottrol, Robert J.
Louisiana State University Law Center 
LSU Law Digital Commons 
Journal Articles Faculty Scholarship 
1995 
The Fifth Auxiliary Right (book review) 
Raymond T. Diamond 
Louisiana State University Law Center, ray.diamond@law.lsu.edu 
Robert J. Cottrol 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Repository Citation 
Diamond, Raymond T. and Cottrol, Robert J., "The Fifth Auxiliary Right (book review)" (1995). Journal 
Articles. 270. 
https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/faculty_scholarship/270 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at LSU Law Digital Commons. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of LSU Law Digital Commons. 
For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu. 
Book Review 
The Fifth Auxiliary Right 
To Keep and Bear Arms: The Origins of an Anglo-American Right. By Joyce 
Lee Malcolm." Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994. Pp. xii, 232. 
$35.00. 
Robert J. Cottrolt and Raymond T. Diamondtt 
[I]n vain would these rights [personal security, personal liberty, and 
private property] be declared, ascertained, and protected by the dead 
letter of the laws, if the constitution had provided no other method to 
secure their actual enjoyment. It has therefore established certain other 
auxiliary subordinate rights of the subject, which serve principally as 
barriers to protect and maintain inviolate the three great and primary 
rights, of personal security, personal liberty, and private property. 
The fifth and last auxiliary right of the subject . . . is that of 
having arms for their defence, suitable to their condition and degree, 
and such as are allowed by law. Which is also declared by the same 
statute ... and is indeed a public allowance, under due restrictions, 
of the natural right of resistance and self-preservation, when the 
sanctions of society and laws are found insufficient to restrain the 
violence of oppression. 1 
* Professor of History, Bentley College. 
t Professor of Law, Rutgers School of Law (Camden). 
tt Professor of Law, Tulane University School of Law. T he authors would like to acknowledge with 
gratitude the research assistance of Robert D. Tennyson, Tulane Law School, J.D. 1 996. 
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Joyce Lee Malcolm's timely study, To Keep and Bear Arms: The Origins 
of an Anglo-American Right,2 brings the insights of a student of early modern 
English political history to the contemporary debate over the Second 
Amendment.3 Through an examination of statutes and cases, of English 
constitutional thought, and of the political, social, and cultural background of 
English history and law from the seventeenth century to the twentieth, 
Malcolm does more than simply outline the history of the English right to 
arms. As her subtitle promises, Malcolm brings into sharp relief the origins of 
the right to arms not only in English ideological and constitutional thought, but 
in American constitutionalism as well. 
Malcolm's study traces the transformation of the traditional duty of the 
English population to have arms for the common defense into the notion of a 
political right to  arms to resist potential excesses of the Crown. She first 
focuses on the political turmoil that was seventeenth-century England, a unique 
century in modern English history. A Scottish family occupied the English 
throne.4 A King, Charles I, was beheaded. A most un-English experiment, 
eleven years of republican rule, the Protectorate, was attempted. And by the 
end of the century, the English exacted a Declaration of Rights from their new 
rulers, William and Mary. That declaration included the right to arms. Then, 
Professor Malcolm takes her study beyond the seventeenth-century background 
that helped produce a formal recognition of the right to arms. She examines 
the subsequent history of the right to arms i n  England and how it became a 
virtual nullity in the twentieth century. 
This Review examines Malcolm's study. Part I explores the modern 
American debate over the Second Amendment-the quality of which will be 
greatly improved by Malcolm's contribution of To Keep and Bear Arms. 
Part II examines Malcolm's treatment of seventeenth-century English 
constitutionalism and how the right to arms became part of English 
constitutional thinking. Part III traces the social and cultural developments that 
led to the ultimate evisceration of the right to arms in the United Kingdom in 
the twentieth century. Part IV concludes by discussing the significance of 
Professor Malcolm's history of the English right to arms for late-twentieth­
century Americans concerned both with guns and violence and with arms and 
rights. 
2. JOYCE L. MALCOLM, To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-AMERICAN RIGHT 
( 1994) [hereinafter To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS]. 
3. "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to 
keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
4. Historian
_
R�ger Lockyer suggests that the friction between the English and their Stuart Kings that 
started at the begmnmg of the seventeenth century may have been rooted in the more authoritarian tradition 
of Scottish law, which, unlike the common law of England, was rooted in Roman law. See generally 
ROGER LOCKYER, TUDOR AND STUART BRITAIN, 1471-1714 (1964). 
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I. AN AMERICAN DEBATE, AN ENGLISH PREFACE 
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The d�ba�e over t
_
he Secon� A
_
mend�ent is one of the more intriguing 
cont�overs1es m American constitutional discourse. Few issues excite greater 
passion. For better than a generation, the debate over the right to keep and bear 
�ms has ?een a staple of editorial and op-ed writers in the popular press.s It 
is the subject of a vast polemical literature by partisans on both sides of the 
often
. 
acrimo�ious gun control debate. Respected legal scholars, in the pages 
of this law Journal, have in recent years termed the Second Amendment 
"embarrassing"6 and "terrifying."7 Warren Burger has indicated his belief that 
the Amendment's inclusion in the Bill of Rights was a mistake, a startling 
assertion about a provision of the Bill of Rights by a former Chief Justice of 
the Supreme Court. 8 
Some see the Amendment as a guarantee of political freedom, a hedge 
against a potentially tyrannical government.9 Despite prevailing stereotypes, 
5. For some examples from the last decade, see, e.g., Daniel Abrams, What "Right To Bear Arms"?, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1989, at A23; Warren E. Burger, The Right To Bear Arms, PARADE MAG., Jan. 14, . 
1990, at 4; Robert J. Cottrol, It's Time To Enforce the Second Amendment, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, Feb. 17, 
1990, at SB; Erwin N. Griswold , Phantom Second Amendment "Rights", WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 1990, at 
C7; Michael Kinsley, Slicing Up the Second Amendment, WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 1990, at A25; Sue 
Wimmershoff-Caplan, The Founders and the AK-47, WASH. POST, July 6, 1989, at A l 7. 
6. Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637 (1989). It should be 
stressed that Levinson's use of the term "embarrassing" to describe the Second Amendment was not an 
indication that he believed the provision inappropriate or out of place in the American constitutional order. 
Instead his article pointed out how the legal academy regarded the right to arms as a constitutional blind 
alley, unworthy of scholarly attention. Levinson's purpose was to inform the academy that important 
constitutional and political issues lie behind the Second Amendment and to encourage scholars to treat 
those issues with due seriousness. His article, along with the deepening of the gun control debate in the 
I 990's, the observance of the two-hundredth anniversary of the Bill of Rights in 1991, the revival of 
interest in civic republicanism in the legal academy, and the reinvigorated debate over the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the incorporation of the Bill of Rights, have all combined to create something of a mini­
boom of Second Amendment scholarship among law teachers. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of 
Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193, 1210--12 (1992); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill 
of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131 (1991); Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The 
Second Amendment: Toward an Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, 80 GEO. L.J. 309 (1991); Glenn H. 
Reynolds, The Right To Keep and Bear Arms Under the Tennessee Constitution: A Case Study in Civic 
Republican Thought, 6 1  TENN. L. REV. 647 (1994); William Van Alstyne, The Second Amendment and the 
Personal Right to Arms, 43 DUKE L.J. 1236 (1994); David E. Vandercoy, The History of the Second 
Amendment, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 1007 (1994). Literary scholar Elaine Scarry has taken the Second 
Amendment issue beyond the traditional confines of the gun control debate and has asked provocative 
questions concerning the Second Amendment's implications for the President's war-making powers in the 
nuclear age. Elaine Scarry, War and the Social Contract: Nuclear Policy, Distribution, and the Right To 
Bear Arms, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1257 (1991); see also Stephanie A. Levin, Grassroots Voices: Local Action 
and National Military Policy, 40 BUFF. L. REV. 321 (1992) (discussing Second Amendment implications 
for national war-making powers). Nicholas Johnson has looked at possible Ninth Amendment protection 
for the right to arms. Nicholas J. Johnson, Beyond the Second Amendment: An Individual Right To Arms 
Viewed Through the Ninth Amendment, 24 RUTGERS L.J. I (1992). 
7. David C. Williams, Civic Republicanism and the Citizen Militia: The Terrifying Second Amendment, 
101 YALE L.J. 551 (1991). 
8. MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour (PBS television broadcast, Dec. 16, 1991), available in LEXIS, News 
Library, Script File. 
9. See, e.g. , Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Political Liberty, and the Right to Self-
Preservation, 39 ALA. L. R EV. I03 (1987). 
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this position cuts across familiar ideological lines. 10 It has been embraced, to 
varying degrees, by the generally conservative National Rifle Association, by 
liberal constitutional scholar Sanford Levinson,I1 and by retired-Army­
Colonel-turned-syndicated-columnist Harry Summers. Ii Others, including 
former Chief Justice Burger,I3 conservative former Supreme Court nominee 
Robert Bork, I4 and various gun control advocacy groups, see the Second 
Amendment as having been inappropriately used as a tool to combat needed 
public safety and anticrime measures. 15 
Oddly enough, this often-rancorous exchange has long been neglected by 
those to whom we normally turn for constitutional interpretation: the legal 
academy and the courts, particularly the U.S. Supreme Court. Members of the 
legal academy, until relatively recently, have been reluctant to join the Second 
Amendment debate, 16 and the nature of the right to arms remains a historical 
10. Ironically, in light of the general tendency of liberals to favor stricter gun control measures and 
the tendency of conservatives to oppose such measures, in the not-too-recent past strong support for the 
right to bear arms as a means of preventing state oppression often came from political figures on the left. 
Both Malcolm X and the Black P anthers urged black people to acquire arms as protection against police 
brutality and attacks by white racists. See Raymond G. Kessler, The Political Functions of Gun Control, 
in FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE 457, 479-82 (Don B. Kates, Jr. ed., 1984). Also, that exemplar of postwar 
liberal thinking, Hubert Humphrey, once vigorously endorsed the link between the right to keep and bear 
arms and political freedom. Writing in a magazine for gun enthusiasts, Humphrey stated: 
Certainly one of the chief guarantees of freedom under any government, no matter how popular 
and respected, is the right of citizens to keep and bear arms. This is not to say that firearms 
should not be very carefully used and that definite safety rules of precaution should not be 
taught and enforced. But the right of citizens to bear arms is just one more guarantee against 
arbitrary government, and one more safeguard against a ty ranny which now appears remote in 
America, but which historically has proved to be always possible. 
Hubert Humphrey, Know Your Lawmakers, GUNS, Feb. 1960, at 4. 
1 1 .  Levinson, supra note 6. 
12. Harry Summers, Gun-Collecting in Uthuania, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1990, at F4. 
13. MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour, supra note 8. 
14. See, e.g., Robert Bork & Laurence Tribe, The Advocates: Point and Counterpoint, LIFE, Fall 1991 
(special issue), at 96. 
15. It should be noted that the vast majority of those who have commented on the Second Amendment 
in the popular press have tended, not surprisingly, to view the Amendment as confirming their own views 
of good public policy. Thus, supporters o.f stricter gun control measures have tended to argue for the 
collective rights view, that is, that the Amendment was only designed to protect the right of states to 
maintain militias, while opponents of stricter measures have tended to argue that the right protected is an 
individual one. See infra notes 21-37 and accompanying text. There are at least two interesting exceptions 
to this general rule. Syndicated columnist Michael Kinsley, a member of the gun control advocacy group 
Handgun Control Inc. and an advocate of stricter gun control, has conceded, reluctantly, that the Second 
Amendment was meant to protect an individual right to arms and that at some level such an intention must 
be honored. See Kinsley, supra note 5, at A25. George Will, another advocate of stricter gun control, has 
conceded: "The National Rifle Association is perhaps correct and certainly is plausible in its 'strong' 
reading of the Second Amendment protection of private gun ownership." George F. Will, Americas Crisis 
of Gunfire, WASH. Pos-r, Mar. 21, 1991, at A2 I. This view has led him to call for the Amendment's repeal. 
16. See supra note 6. Second Amendment scholarship is one area where practicing attorneys, usually 
activists in the gun control controversy, have done pioneering work, often leaving their academic colleagues 
to follow in their footsteps. Three of the most prolific and influential practitioner-scholars in the field whose 
writings, beginning in the 1980's, have played a major part in producing the ongoing academic 
reexamination of the subject in the 1990's are Stephen P. Halbrook, David T. Hardy, and Don B. Kates, Jr. 
Their writings have played a major role in reinvigorating the individual rights view of the Second 
Amendment and in revealing the links between the Second Amendment and such themes as individual self­
defense, classical republican ideology, and the Fourteenth Amendment's incorporation of the Bill of Rights. 
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controversy more faithfully attended to by partisans on different sides of the 
gun control debate than by professional historians.17 The Second Amendment 
also continues to be an arena of jurisprudence from which the nation's highest 
Court has largely been absent. The nation's highest tribunal has seriously 
addressed the issue in only three cases, 18 and the most recent of these, United 
See, e.g., STEPHE N P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED: THE EVOLUTION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHT (1984) [hereinafter HALBROOK, EVERY MA N]; Stephen P. Halbrook, The Jurisprudence of the 
Second and Fourteenth Amendments, 4 GE O. MASON U. L. REY. 1 (1981); Stephen P. Halbrook, What the 
Framers Intended: A Linguistic Anal ysis of the Right To "Bear Arms", 49 LAW & CONTE MP. PROBS. 151 
( 1986) [hereinafter Halbrook, What the Framers Intended]; David T. Hardy, Armed Citizens, Citizen 
Armies: Toward a Jurisprudence of the Second Amendment, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 559 (1986); David 
T. Hardy, The Second Amendment and the Historiography of the Bill of Rights, 4 J.L. & POL ' Y I (1987) 
[hereinafter Hardy, Historiography]; Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Me aning of 
the Second Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204 (1983) (hereinafter Kates, Handgun Prohibition]; Don B. 
Kates, Jr., The Second Amendment: A Dialogue, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 143 (1986); Don B. Kates, 
Jr., The Second Amendment and the Ideology of Self-Protection, 9 CONST. COMME NTARY 87 (1992). 
17. In part because the Second Amendment debate is fundamentally a debate about historical meaning, 
historians entered the debate somewhat earlier than members of the legal academy. One important debate 
about the implications of classical republican political ideology for the collective rights and individual rights 
perspectives on the Second Amendment occurred in the J 980's in the leading journal on U.S. history, The 
Journal of American History. See Lawrence D. Cress, An Armed Community: The Origins and Meaning 
of the Right To Bear Arms, 7 1  J. AM. HIST. 22 (1984); Robert E .  Shalhope, The Ideological Origins of the 
Second Amendment, 69 J. AM. HIST. 599 (1982); Robert E. Shalhope & Lawrence D. Cress, The Second 
Amendment and the Right To Bear Arms: An Exchange, 71 J. AM. HIST. 587 (1984). Joyce Malcolm had 
also done considerable writing on the subject, even before the publication of To Keep and Bear Arms. See, 
e.g., JOYCE L. MALCOLM, DISARMED: THE Loss OF THE RIGHT To BE AR ARMS IN RESTORATION 
ENGLAND; Joyce L. Malcolm, The Creation of a "True Antient and Indubitable" Right: The English Bill 
of Rights and the Right To Be Armed, 32 J. BRIT. STUD. 226 ( 1993); Joyce L. Malcolm, The Right of the 
People To Keep and Bear Arms: The Common Law Tradition, IO HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 285 (1983) 
[hereinafter Malcolm, The Right of the People]; Joyce L. Malcolm, Book Review, 54 GE O. WASH. L. REV. 
452 (1986) (reviewing HALBROOK, EVERY MAN, supra note 16). 
18. See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886); United 
States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876). The Second Amendment actually has had a somewhat curious 
history in the nation's highest Court. Cruikshank and Presser really tell us more about the Court's reaction 
to the Fourteenth Amendment than to the Second. Miller, the only case in which the Court has had to 
decide the extent to which the Second Amendment limits the ability of the federal government to restrict 
the possession of certain types of firearms, was decided even though the Court heard only the government's 
case. See Robert J. Cottrol, The Second Amendment: Invitation to a Multi-Dimensional Debate, in GUN 
CONTROL AND THE CONSTITUTION at ix, xxvi-xxix (Robert J. Cottrol ed., 1994). Since Miller, although 
a .number of lower federal courts have upheld various gun control measures by reasoning either that the 
Second Amendment does not restrict action by state governments or that it protects only the right of a state 
to maintain militias, the Supreme Court generally has declined to hear these cases and make a definitive 
modern pronouncement on the subject. See Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 
1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983). 
Although the Court has done little to develop an actual jurisprudence of the Second Amendment, it 
has a Jong history of presenting the Amendment in what might be termed "family portraits" of the rights 
of the American people. T his has occurred in cases having nothing to do with the issue of firearms 
regulation. Thus in. Dred Scott v. Sanford, Chief Justice Roger Taney argued that Negroes, slave or free, 
could not be citizens because they were commonly subject to restrictions that would, presumably, have been 
impermissible if imposed on whites: 
It would give to persons of the negro race, who were recognized as citizens in any one State 
of the Union, the right to enter every other State whenever they pleased, . . .  and it would give 
them the full liberty of speech in public and in private upon all subjects upon which its own 
citizens might speak; to hold public meetings upon political affairs, and to keep and carry arms 
wherever they went. 
Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 417 (1857) (emphasis added). 
In more recent times, even as the right to arms has become more politically controversial, the Second 
Amendment has served as a kind of curious bit player in Supreme Court opinions dealing with the right 
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States v. Miller, is over fifty years old. 
This controversy occurs at the most fundamental level: It is a debate over 
the Amendment's basic meaning. Briefly stated, the modem debate over the 
Second Amendment is about the extent to which that constitutional provision 
was intended to limit the ability of government to prohibit or severely restrict 
private ownership of firearms. It is a debate shaped in part by high national 
crime rates-an average of 11,000 homicides occur annually in incidents 
involving firearms19-and in part by the presence of firearms in roughly half 
the households in the country. 20 
This debate has produced two familiar interpretations of the Second 
Amendment. Advocates of stricter gun controls have tended to stress the 
Amendment's Militia Clause ("A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the 
security of a free State"), arguing that the purpose of the Amendment was to 
maintain state militias against federal encroachment. 21 Advocates of this view, 
to privacy. Starting with Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman, a case involving Connecticut's 
anticontraception statute, Court decisions have reiterated Harlan's view that the rights of Americans are 
more extensive than those enumerated in the Bill of Rights: 
[T]he full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause cannot be found in or 
limited by the precise terms of the specific guarantees elsewhere provided in the Constitution. 
This "liberty" is not a series of isolated points pricked out in tenns of the taking of property; 
the freedom of speech, press, and religion; the right to keep and bear arms. 
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 ( 1 96 1 )  (emphasis added); see, e. g. , Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 1 1 2 
S. Ct. 279 1 ,  28 1 1  ( 1 992) (quoting Poe, 367 U.S. at 543); Moore v. City ofE. Cleveland, 43 1 U.S. 494, 
50 1 ( 1 977) (same); Roe v. Wade, 4 1 0  U.S. 1 13, 169 ( 1 973) (same). 
More recently, in his discussion of the scope of the term "the people," Chief Justice William 
Rehnquist hinted at his views on the Second Amendment: 
"[T]he people" seems to have been a term of art employed in select parts of the Constitution. 
The Preamble declares that the Constitution is ordained and established by "the People of the 
United States." The Second Amendment protects "the right of the people to keep and bear 
Arms," and the Ninth and Tenth Amendments provide that certain rights and powers are 
retained by and reserved to "the people." .. . While this textual exegesis is by no means 
conclusive, it suggests that "the people" protected by the Fourth Amendment, and by the First 
and Second Amendments, and to whom rights and powers are reserved in the Ninth and Tenth 
A mendments, refers to a class of persons who are part of a national community or who have 
otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of that 
community. 
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1 990) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
In a very real sense, for the modern Supreme Court, the Second Amendment has become akin to a 
disreputable member of the family. The modem Court acknowledges the Second Amendment on occasions 
when generally discussing the constitutional rights of Americans, even though the Court remains reluctant 
to grapple with cases squarely addressing the Second Amendment. William Van Alstyne makes the valuable 
observation that the Court's treatment of the Second Amendment is very much like its treatment of the First 
Amendment before World War I. The Amendment was acknowledged but was not the subject of any 
meaningful case law or jurisprudence. Van Alstyne, supra note 6, at 1 239. 
19. Homicides, however, do not constitute the majority of firearm-related deaths. Criminologist Gary 
Kleck breaks the 3 1 ,606 total firearm deaths for the year 1 985 into the following categories: accident 
(1 649); suicide (1 7,369); homicide ( 1 1 ,621 ); legal intervention, i.e., killings by police in the line of duty 
( 486); undetermined ( 481 ). GARY KLECK, POINT BLANK: GUNS AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 60-61 ( 1 991  ). 
20. Id. at xiii; JAMES D. WRIGHT ET AL., UNDER THE GUN: WEAPONS, CRIME, AND VIOLENCE IN 
AMERICA 1 1 6-17 (1 983). 
2 1 .  See, e.g., Cress, supra note 1 7; Keith A. Ehrman & Dennis A. Henigan, The Second Amendment 
in the Twentieth Century: Have You Seen Your Militia Lately?, 1 5  U. DAYTON L. REV. 5 ( 1 989); Roy G. 
Weatherup, Standing Armies and Armed Citizens: An Historical Analysis of the Second Amendment, 2 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 961 ( 1 975). 
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the so-called collective rights theory, argue that the Framers' sole concern was 
preventing the concentration of military power in the hands of the federal 
government. 
Opponents of stricter gun controls have tended to stress the Amendment's 
second clause ("the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be 
infringed") and note that the Framers intended a militia of the whole, or at 
least one consisting of the entire able-bodied white male population. They 
argue that this militia of the whole was expected to perform its duties with 
privately owned weapons. Advocates of this individual rights theory also argue 
that the Militia Clause should be read as an amplifying rather than a qualifying 
clause; that is, although maintaining a "well-regulated militia" was a major 
reason for including the Second Amendment in the Bill of Rights, it should not 
be viewed as the sole or limiting reason. Instead, other reasons, such as a right 
to individual self-defense, must be understood as within the Framers' 
contemplations.22 
Little in either the historical record or the language of the Amendment 
supports the collective rights theory, at least at its most simplistic level-i.e., 
that the Second Amendment simply was meant to reserve states the right to 
raise or maintain militia units.23 The historical evidence overwhelmingly 
supports the view that the militia envisioned in the Second Amendment 
consisted of virtually all adult white men24 equipped with their own arms.25 
22. For two representative examples of these opposing viewpoints, see Cress, supra note 17, and 
Kates, Handgun Prohibition, supra note 16. 
23. But see Michael K. Beard & Kristen M. Rand, The Handgun Battle, 20 BILL RTS. J. 13 (1987) 
(arguing that Second Amendment is concerned with states' rights rather than individual rights). 
24. For a discussion of the sentiments of the Framers' generation concerning the armed populace, 
select and universal militias, and the maintenance of political freedom, see HALBROOK, EVERY MAN, supra 
note 16, at 55-87; see also Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 6, at 327-30. The first militia act, the Uniform 
Militia Act of 1792, called for the enrollment of every free, able-bodied white male citizen between the 
ages of 18 and 45. Militia members were required to arm themselves. Uniform Militia Act of 1792, ch. 33, 
§ I, I Stat. 271. We have argued that, even though the Act specified the enrollment of white men, women 
and free black men were also part of the militia. See Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 6, at 316 n.22, 
331-32. 
It is of dual significance that, overwhelmingly, commentators in the antebellum y ears of the 19th 
century wrote of the Second Amendment as a right of individuals. To our knowledge, no commentator in 
the antebellum era offered an interpretation of the Second Amendment that indicated that the right was only 
a right of the states or was limited to those actively involved in militia service. See, e.g., Nunn v. Georgia, 
I Ga. 243, 250 (1846); JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
708-:-09 (Carolina Academic Press 1987) (1833). 
The importance of such antebellum interpretations does not end with the light they may shed on the 
original meaning of the Second Amendment. Such interpretations also have much to tell us about how the 
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment viewed the Second Amendment and the extent to which they 
intended to protect the right to bear arms against state infringement. The best evidence indicates that the 
proponents of the Fourteenth Amendment in the 39th Congress saw the individual right to arms as a 
fundamental one requiring federal protection against state infringement. See MICHAEL K. CURTIS, No 
STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FO URTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1986); Amar, The Bill 
of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 6, at 1237; Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 6, at 
342-49; Halbrook, The Jurisprudence of the Second and Fourteenth Amendments, supra note 16, at 9-11. 
25. Uniform Militia Act of 1792, ch. 33, § I, I Stat. 271. The Miller Court recognized this point: 
The signification attributed to the term Militia appears from the debates in the Convention, the 
history and legislation of Colonies and States, and the writings of approved commentators. 
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A universally or even widely armed population was seen as supporting a well­
regulated militia in at least two ways. First, it ensured arms for the individual 
militiaman: He brought his own. Second, it guaranteed widespread familiarity 
with arms amongst the population, enhancing the military effectiveness of the 
militia of the whole. 
The text of the Second Amendment also poses unmet challenges for those 
who would claim that it was not meant to protect an individual right.26 
Several points should be noted. To begin with, the first clause, discussing the 
well-regulated militia, seems to be the dependent clause. According to this 
reading, a well-regulated militia depends on the right of the people to keep and 
bear arms. The language does not support the opposite reading, that the right 
of the people to keep and bear arms depends on the maintenance or 
preservation of a well-regulated militia. It should also be noted that the 
Amendment has two parts: ( 1) an observation, or perhaps a cautionary note 
("A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State") and 
(2) a command or legal requirement ("the right of the people to keep and bear 
Arms, shall not be infringed"). The plain language of the first clause appears 
to impose no legal requirement or restriction on the federal government. Only 
the second clause indicates a right that the government cannot infringe. 
In addition, the second clause speaks of the "right of the people." We 
agree with Chief Justice Rehnquist's assertion in United States v. Verdugo­
Urquidez21 that "the people" referred to in the Second Amendment are the 
same as "the people" discussed in the First, Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth 
Amendments. It is hardly credible to assume that the Framers' reference to 
"the people" indicated intent to protect the rights of private individuals to 
assemble peaceably and to petition the government in the First Amendment, 
but was somehow transformed in the Second Amendment to refer to a right of 
states to keep and bear arms, and then miraculously reverted to indicate an 
individual right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects in the 
Fourth Amendment and an individual's residual rights and powers in the Ninth 
and Tenth Amendments. It should also be noted that the term "the people" is 
a broader term than "the militia." Although the First Congress envisioned a 
militia that would encompass virtually the entire adult male population below 
the age of forty-five,28 the term "the people" certainly was meant to include 
These show plainly enough that the Militia comprised all males physically capable of acting in 
concert for the common defense. "A body of citizens enrolled for military discipline." And 
furth�r, that ordinarily when called for service these men were expected to appear bearing arms 
supplied by themselves and of the kind in common use at the time. 
United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939). 
26. For two studies that have contributed to the textual interpretation of the Second Amendment, see Halbrook, What the Framers Intended, supra note 16; Van Alstyne, supra note 6. 
27. 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1989); see supra note 18. 
28. Uniform Militia Act of 1792, ch. 33, § I, I Stat. 271. 
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adult white men over that age, adult white women, and, arguably, free 
Negroes. 
Closer examination of the second clause further supports the individual 
rights interpretation. The phrase "to bear arms" is ambiguous. It could be 
interpreted either as bearing arms for militia purposes or as bearing arms for 
private purposes. An individual right to keep arms, however, can only be 
looked upon as a private right, a right to have arms in one's home. Even the 
most restrictive view of that right-that the right protected is only a right to 
keep arms in one's home to ensure availability for militia duty-presents the 
right as the individual's right and not the state's. 
Finally, the language of the Second Amendment suggests an intent to 
preserve a recognized, preexisting right rather than to create a new one. If, for 
example, the Amendment was intended to create a right to address the needs 
of states to maintain militias, the text might have read: "A well-regulated 
Militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the people shall have the 
right to keep and bear Arms." The use of the phrase "the right of the people" 
instead of the phrase "the people shall have the right" suggests a preexisting 
right that at the very least encompasses the right to arms for militia purposes 
but that presumably is even broader.29 
Although the most simplistic variant of the collective rights theory runs 
into such stubborn historical and textual resistance that, at its most extreme, 
it can be readily dismissed as a type of result-oriented constitutional denial, 
there is a more sophisticated version of the collective rights view that raises 
more difficult questions and deserves closer scrutiny. The sophisticated 
collective rights view acknowledges that the Second Amendment was designed 
to protect individual ownership of arms, but then argues that this individual 
guarantee was inextricably linked to the maintenance of the militia. 30 In short, 
unlike the individual rights theorists, the sophisticated collective rights 
adherents see the individual right as existing but also see the Amendment's 
well-regulated militia clause as qualifying rather than amplifying. For these 
theorists the answer becomes simple: Because the militia of the whole has· 
essentially disappeared, then the individual right has ceased to exist. The 
Second Amendment poses no impediment to gun control measures, however 
restrictive. 
29. Roger Sherman's 1789 proposal for the Bill of Rights offers an actual point of co mparison. That 
proposal included a provision designed to safeguard state militia prerogatives. Note how its language differs 
from that of the Second Amendment: 
The militia shall be under the government of the laws of the respective States, when not in the 
actual Service of the united States, but such rules as may be prescribed by Congress for their 
uniform organization & discipline shall be observed in officering and training them, but military 
Service shall not be required of persons religiously scrupulous of bearing arms. 
ROGER SHERMAN, PROPOSAL FOR A SEPARAW BILL OF RIGHTS (1789), quoted in Herbert Mitgang, 
Handwritten Draft of a Bill of Rights Found, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 1987, at Al, C21. 
30. See, e.g., Cress, supra note 17. 
1004 The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 104: 995 
The issue is not so simple. If the relationship between the armed citizen 
and the militia has become somewhat theoretical, if not tenuous, in late 
twentieth-century America, 31 important questions about arms and rights 
nonetheless remain. Perhaps the most fundamental of these questions has to do 
with the militia itself. What, from the point of view of the Framers of the 
Second Amendment, was the reason for attempting to guarantee a militia and 
an armed population to support it? One might view the sole purpose as the 
military goal of enabling states and communities to meet their security needs 
by being able to draw upon an armed population whenever necessary. If so, 
then the frequently advanced argument that the preemption of national, state, 
and community security by the police and armed forces has largely made the 
Second Amendment moot has some merit, even granting the claim that an 
armed population retains a residual security function. If the purpose of the 
Second Amendment was purely military, then the right of the government to 
dissolve the militia of the whole and substitute more efficient police and 
military organizations is clear. The right protected is simply a right of the 
government to raise militias or similar bodies. When the government no longer 
needs to do so, it may disarm the population. This purely military view of the 
Second Amendment in turn raises the question of why the Amendment was 
ever needed. Governments that need to raise emergency security forces on an 
ad hoc basis from the population at large can, of course, store weapons to be 
distributed to the population during times of emergency. This can be, and often 
has been, done even by totalitarian states that do not guarantee a right to arms, 
nor indeed many other rights.32 
But there is considerable evidence that the armed population and the 
militia were intended to serve more than a simple military function. They were 
seen as fulfilling political and perhaps moral purposes as well. 33 Indeed, the 
government's ability to disarm the population must be questioned if the 
purposes of guaranteeing a right to arms and organizing popular militias 
include allowing the citizen to resist governmental tyranny and preventing the 
citizen from becoming overly dependent on the government for survival.34 
31. It should be noted that federal law still recognizes the concept of the militia at large. See I 0 U.S.C. 
§ 311 ( 1988). Also, the majority of states still recognize that fraternal twin of the militia at large, the posse 
com�tatus, the power of law enforcement officials to summon the citizenry at large to aid authorities in 
makmg arrests and quelling civil disturbances. See, e.g., C AL. PENAL CODE § 150 (West 1991); MONT. 
CODE ANN. § 45-7-304 (1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-22-2 (Michie 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 17-22 
(1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 2921.23 (Anderson 1993). 
32. During World War II, the Nazi government managed to mobilize a significant civilian militia in 
Germany, the Volksturm, which was equipped with government-supplied arms. ALAN CLARK, BARBAROSSA: 
THE RUSSIAN GERMAN CONFLICT, 1941-1945, at 397-98, 425 (1965). 
33. See, e.g., Robert E. Shalhope, The Armed Citizen in the Early Republic, 49 LAW & CoNTEMP. 
PROBS. 125, 126--33 (1986). 
34. See Kates, The Second Amendment and the Ideology of Self-Protection, supra note 16, at 91-98; 
Shalhope, supra note 33, at 126- 33; Will, supra note 15, at A21. Richard Henry Lee succinctly expressed 
the fears of many Framers concerning unhealthy reliance on select forces for the security of the citizenry 
when he charged that such reliance "commit[s] the many to the mercy, prudence, and moderation of the 
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Can the government, in effect, extinguish the population's right to the means 
of resistance and self-reliance by determining that its right to raise police and 
military forces is best served by allocating resources to professional and 
semiprofessional organizations rather than by maintaining the unwieldy, and 
admittedly less effective, militia of the whole? 
This question of the balance of power between the state and its citizens is 
one of long-standing c oncern in the history of arms and rights. For example, 
the seventeenth-century Stuart monarchs both established select militias and 
attempted to disarm large portions of the English population. 35 Well  into the 
late nineteenth century, a consensus about the relationship between arms and 
political liberty existed among constitutional commentators. In 1833, U.S. 
Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story expressed his fear that popular neglect of 
the militia, which even by that date had considerably less than universal 
participation, could weaken the arming of the population: 
The right of the citizens to keep, and bear arms has justly been 
considered, as the palladium of the liberties of a republic; since it 
offers a strong moral check against the usurpation and arbitrary power 
of rulers; and will generally, even if these are successful in the first 
instance, enable the people to resist, and triumph over them. And yet, 
though this truth would seem so clear, and the importance of a well 
regulated militia would seem so undeniable, it cannot be disguised, 
that among the American people there is a growing indifference to 
any system of militia discipline, and a strong disposition, from a sense 
of its burthens, to be rid of all regulations. How it is practicable to 
keep the people duly armed without some organization, it is difficult 
to see. There is certainly no small danger, that indifference may lead 
to disgust, and disgust to contempt; and thus gradually undermine all 
the protection intended by this clause of our national bill of rights.36 
Michigan Supreme Court Justice Thomas M. Cooley also expressed the 
traditional view linking the preservation of the right to arms and the ability of 
the population to resist potential governmental usurpation. His analysis 
anticipated and answered the modern view that the right only extended to 
members of the militia: 
The Right is General.-lt may be supposed from the phraseology 
of this provision that the right to keep and bear arms was only 
guaranteed to the militia; but this would be an interpretation not 
warranted by the intent. The militia, as has been elsewhere explained, 
consists of those persons who, under the law, are liable to the 
few." Quoted in THE ANTIFEDERALISTS 229 (Cecelia M. Kenyon ed., 1966). 
35. See generally To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS, supra note 2, at 17-53 (discussing efforts of Charles I 
and Charles II to prevent rebellion by disarming English population). 
36. STORY, supra note 24, at 708--09. 
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performance of military duty, and are officered and .e�rolled for service when called upon. But the law may make prov1s1on for the 
enrolment of all who are fit to perform military duty, or of a small 
number only, or it may wholly omit to make any provision at all; and 
if the right were limited to those enrolled, the purpose of this guaranty 
might be defeated altogether by the action or neglect to act of the 
government it was meant to hold in check. The meaning of the 
provision undoubtedly is, that the people, from whom the mil itia must 
be taken, shall have the right to keep and bear arms, and they need no 
permission or regulation of law for the purpose. But this enables the 
government to have a well regulated militia; for to bear arms implies 
something more than the mere keeping; it implies the learning to 
handle and use them in a way that makes those who keep them ready 
for their efficient use; in other words, it implies the right to meet for 
voluntary discipline in arms, observing in doing so the laws of public 
order.37 
The writings of Justice Story and Justice Cooley reflected a constitutional 
consensus that had been developing in Anglo-American jurisprudence and 
political philosophy since the seventeenth century. Part II of this Review 
examines the origins of that consensus in seventeenth-century England. 
II. FROM ANCIENT DUTY TO INDUBITABLE RIGHT 
Malcolm focuses in To Keep and Bear Arms on the origins of the 
constitutional consensus concerning the right to arms in the political turmoil 
of seventeenth-century England. The first to treat the subject at book length,38 
Malcolm traces the notion of a right to arms from the subject's traditional duty 
under English law to have anns and participate in the militia and sheriff's 
posse to the political conflict that led to the adoption of a provision 
safeguarding the right of Protestants to have arms in the English Declaration 
of Rights of 1689.39 Her study continues beyond the seventeenth century, 
examining how the notion of a right to arms and its link to political liberty 
became a major element of the Whiggish variant of Anglo-American political 
thought on both sides of the Atlantic in the eighteenth century. 
Malcolm begins with the important insight that the notion of a right to 
arms was a relatively late development in English political thought. A legal 
duty to own arms to participate in the common defense had existed from the 
37. THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTI ONAL LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 
OF AMERICA 298 (Andrew C. McLaughlin ed., Boston, Little, Brown, 3d ed. 1898); see also THOMAS M. 
COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTI ONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER 
OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 498-99 (Victor H. Lane ed., 7th ed. 1903). 
38. Malcolm had previously published articles addressing the English right to arms. See sources cited 
supra note 17. 
39. "That the Subjects which are Protestants may have Arms for their Defence suitable to their Conditions 
and as allowed by Law." English Declaration of Rights, I W. & M., sess. 2, ch. 2 (1 689) (Eng.). 
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dim beginnings of English history.40 Lacking a standing army until the 
seventeenth century and professional police forces until the nineteenth, English 
authorities traditionally relied on privately equipped citizen forces for both 
internal security and defense of the realm.41 Beginning in the twelfth century, 
the duty to be armed was specifically codified. In 1 1 8 1 ,  the Assize of Arms 
was proclaimed, requiring that all free men possess arms and armor suitable 
to their condition.42 By the thirteenth century the requirement to possess arms 
to participate in the common defense was extended to medieval England's 
unfree class, the villeins. 43 Those of that class possessing sufficient property 
also were required to be armed and to participate in maintaining the security 
of their communities.44 
Participation was meant to be vigorous. All able-bodied men were part of 
the militia. Sheriffs employed the posse comitatus, the legal power to summon 
the help of all men between the ages of sixteen and sixty. All subjects were 
expected to participate in giving chase to criminal suspects, supplying their 
own arms for the occasion. There were legal penalties for failure to 
participate. 45 
From the beginning, this requirement of an armed population coexisted 
with regulation of the possession of arms along class46 and later religious 
lines.47 By the sixteenth century, Parliament passed a statute that limited the 
carrying of some handguns and crossbows to those with incomes over one 
hundred pounds per year. 48 
This world of the universally deputized English population, ready to assist 
either the sheriff's posse or the king's militia with arms appropriate to station 
in life, began to change fundamentally in the sixteenth century. As religious 
40. To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS, supra note 2, at 1 - 1 1 .  
4 1 .  Id. 
42. WILLIAM STUBBS, SELECT CHARTERS AND OTHER ILLUSTRATIONS OF ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL 
HISTORY FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO lHE REIGN OF EDWARD THE FIRST 1 8 1 -84 (H.W.C. Davis ed., 
Oxford Univ. Press, 9th ed. 1 948) ( 1 870). 
43. Pollock and Maitland note that villeinage was a type of unfree land tenure in which the tenant in 
villeinage might be either a serf or a free man. In either case the property rights connected to the tenure 
were not protected by the king's courts or law but instead by the custom of the manor. A free man who 
held in villeinage could leave the property or acquire other property not connected to his lord. A serf, on 
the other hand, was an unfree man holding an unfree land tenure. He usually passed to the lord's heirs with 
the land, though, like the free villein, the serf could be ejected from the land at the lord's wil l  without any 
recourse to the king's courts. For students of American s lavery it is interesting to note that, while an 
English serf seems to have had no ability to take legal action against the lord, he was to be treated by the 
law as a free man in disputes with those other than his lord. I FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC W. 
MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I, at 356--83, 4 1 2-23 (2d ed. 
1959). 
44. Id. at 42 1 ,  565. 
45. To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS, supra note 2, at 3; see also ALAN HARDING, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF 
ENGLISH LAW 59 ( 1 966); Malcolm, The Right of the People, supra note 1 7, at 29 1 .  
46. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text. 
47. To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS, supra note 2, at 1 1 .  
48. Malcolm, The Right of the People, supra note 1 7, at 292-93 (challenging view that restriction was 
on arms ownership generally). 
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conflict intensified towards the end of the sixteenth century, Catholics 
experienced greater restrictions on the use and possession of arms. 
Increasingly, arms in the h ands of Catholics w ere seen less as contributions to 
the common defense and more as instruments of potential subversion. Still, as 
Malcolm tells us, these restrictions never rose to the level of total prohibition 
of arms for defense of the home.49 
Other developments further weakened the traditional link between the 
people, their arms, and the common defense. By the sixteenth century it was 
becoming clear that the indifference to militia training and disc ipline against 
which Justice Story50 would caution his fellow citizens some three centu ries 
later had overtaken the English people. Despite Henry VITI's best efforts to 
revive militia training, particularly marksmanship practice, the militia rem ained 
an indifferent military force. The population at large was reluctant to devote 
much time to military drill, and the Crown had to contend with the possibility 
that the militia would prove politically unreliable when called upon to suppress 
internal dissension.51 
This sixteenth-century world-characterized by waning adherence to the 
traditional obligation to be armed, religious turmoil, and the Crown's 
dependence on an often less-than-reliable militia-would provide, later in the 
seventeenth century, some of the principal ingredients for the first serious 
attempts at large-scale disarming of the English people. Charles I's attempts 
to create a more reliable militia led to efforts at intensified train ing,52 which 
frequently increased friction between the Crown and its subjects. Both James 
I and his son Charles I enforced game laws with a greater vigor than their 
Tudor predecessors.53 Both asserted a roy al monopoly on production of 
gunpowder.54 
By the time of the English Civil War in 1642, the mechanisms were in 
place for wholesale attempts to disarm large portions of the English population. 
Royalists attempted to disarm republicans who--naturally-sought to return 
the favor, particularly after the execution of Charles I and the establishment of 
the Commonwealth Interregnum under Oliver Cromwell. Republican rule 
brought about a professional army and efforts to disarm the e leven-year 
Protectorate's enemies, among them royalists and Catholics.55 With the New 
Model Army usurping the militia's role as the nation's primary defense force, 
the militia increasingly came to be used for police purposes such as disarming 
dissidents. 56 
49. Id. 
50. See STORY, supra note 24; see also supra text accompanying note 36. 
5 1 .  To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS, supra note 2, at 1-15.  
52.  Id. at 7.  
53.  Id. at 1 3-15. 
54. Id. at 1 7-1 8. 
55. Id. at 23. 
56. Id. at 24. 
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The Restoration brought a reversal of republican and royalist fortunes. That 
the Commonwealth government had only sought to disarm a minority of the 
En�lish popul�tion57 attested to a governmental belief that the majority 
actively or tacitly supported the republ ican cause.58 For Charles II and his 
supporters, the relationship between the armed population and the threat of 
rebellion was even more acute than it had been for Cromwel l .  Faced with a 
well-armed popu lace, much of which had republican sympathies, and i nitially 
lacking military forces and arms, Charles II approached the business of 
disarming potential subversives with caution . One of the tools used to perform 
this task was the establishment of a select militia, volunteer units given 
intensive military training. Such units were valuable because they received 
training superior to the often haphazard dri l l  of the militia at large. They could 
also be selected for their political reli ability. Charles II, suspicious of the 
English trad ition of the armed population, used this select militia to disarm 
those considered "politic ally unreliable," a category that continued t o  expand 
under his re ign.�., Charles H's efforts were aided by Parliament's passage of 
the Game Act of 1 67 1 .Mi 
But Charles II fa iled to achieve his goal of large-scale disarmament. 
Restrictive firearms legislation seems to have been enforced with a decided 
ambivalence by the courts and the nobil ity.61 It would take the reign of James 
II and inc reased fears o f  monarchical absolutism and Catholic domination62 
to cause widespread oppos ition to disarmament and the formal i ntroduction of 
a right to arms into English constitutional sensibilities. James II sought to 
enforce arms restrictions with greater v i gor than his predecessor.63 And the 
pattern that had prevailed for nearly a century-that Protes�ants' p�s�ession of 
arms was unquestioned while Catholics'  was viewed with susp1c1on-was 
57. Id. at 23. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. at 3 1 -53. 
60. Id. at 54-76. 
61 .  Id. at 3 1 -76. . odem Americans and Britons have had their 62. A not altogether insu�stant1al case can be made
) 
that ·� 
athies that he generated irrevocably biased hi storical perceptions 
.
concerning James II a?d the P?P
u
r:r :n �d commentary. It is, of course, clear that by some three centunes of subsequent �h�g. h1stri1o�ts �n� limitations on state power, including the right modem Anglo-Amencan conceptions of md1v1dua r g 
II S ·n·'ra note 65 and accompanying text. h Wh' opposition to James · ee 1 �· to arms, owe much to t e ig 
d 1 f the popular dissatisfaction with the Stuart Nonetheless it should be remembered that a 
W
go�d ea 
h? motivations James II officially promoted a monarch stemmed from religious intolerance. atever .s 
t His First and Second Declarations of ' C h I' and dissenting Protestant sec s. policy of toleration 1or at o 1�s . . . tholics and Protestant dissenters, allowing them to. engage Indulgence removed the legal d1sabihties of Ca 
t d fears that it would pave the way for . I' t w'th large-scale resentmen an 
. I f h in public worship. That po icy me 1 . S d Declaration that led to the famous Tna o t e ultimate Catholic domination. Indeed, it was the ec
G
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l . Revolution See LOCKYER, supra note 4, at 
· 
' tat' events of the onous · 603 1 689 Seven Bishops, one of the preclpl mg FLICfS OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY I - • 355-61 ;  J.R. TANNER, ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL CON 
at 250-60 ( 1 962). 
2 94-1 1 2  63. To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS, supra note ' at . 
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reversed. James II sought to disarm the increasingly restless Protestant 
majority-while keeping arms in the hands of his Catholic allies.64 
The Glorious Revolution, the Protestant rebellion that swept James II from 
the throne and replaced him with William and Mary, brought with it a demand 
for formal limitations on royal power and recognition of the rights of subjects. 
The Declaration of Rights of 1689 expressed what, by the end of the 
seventeenth century, had come to be regarded as the "ancient rights of 
Englishmen." Included was a right to arms for Protestants.65 
Among the many strengths of Malcolm's study is that it takes the 
discussion of English sentiments on the right to arms beyond the 1689 
Declaration. In the eighteenth century, Whiggish .thinkers warned against the 
dangers posed by standing armies and extolled the virtues of an armed 
citizenry, or at least an armed Protestant citizenry. Malcolm's examination of 
the growth of this sentiment and how it translated into legislative and judicial 
64. Id. 
65. The plain text of the English provision, the obvious ancestor of the Second Amendment, has posed 
problems for collective rights theorists. Some have tried to read the seventh provision of the English 
Declaration of Rights as only protecting the right of the militia to be armed, see, e.g., Weatherup, supra 
note 2 1 ,  at 973-74, but that is a highly strained reading of a provision in which the word "militia" is 
nowhere used. Malcolm's previous research also indicates that the convention that drafted the Bill of Rights 
initially discussed the drafting of a dual collective and individual rights provision, ultimately rejecting that 
possibility for the final provision with which we are familiar. The arms provision went through three drafts: 
[ 1 .] It is necessary for the publick Safety, that the Subjects which are Protestants, should 
provide and keep Arms for their common Defence. And that the Arms which have been 
seized, and taken from them, be restored. 
[2.] That the Subjects, which are Protestants, may provide and keep Arms, for their common 
Defence. 
[3.] That the Subjects which are Protestants may have Arms for their Defence suitable to their 
Conditions and as allowed by Law. 
Quoted in Malcolm, The Right of the People, supra note 17, at 307. 
Nor have those attempting to read a militia-only right into the English provision been able to explain 
how it is that I 8th-century English commentators such as Blackstone saw the right in individual terms. See 
infra note 68 and accompanying text. 
Some collective rights theorists also have tried to explain away the 1 689 right to arms by noting that 
it did not prevent subsequent regulation of arms in Britain, including a fairly draconian regime (by 
American standards) of gun control in the 20th century. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, 
THE CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO GUN CONTROL 1 42-43 (1987); Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 2 1 ,  at 9-1 0. 
Subsequent firearms regulation, however, in no way casts doubt on the intended meaning of the 1 689 
provision. The 1 689 provision was a statutory provision intending to limit the King's power. Under British 
constitutional doctrine of Parliamentary supremacy, the provision could not restrict subsequent acts of 
Parliament. Despite Sir Edward Coke's efforts to introduce the notion that fundamental English legal 
principles, as reflected in the common law, could restrict Parliament, see Dr. Bonham's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 
646 (C.P. 16 10), that notion has been rejected, see Theodore F.T. Plucknett, Bonham 's Case and Judicial 
Review, 40 HARV. L. REV . 30 ( 1 926). Thus, although it might be possible to debate the extent to which 
the 1 689 provision reflected long-standing English notions of a right to arms or merely a reaction to the 
1 7th-century experience, to discuss it in American constitutional terms as limiting future legislation is to 
fail to take into account the profound difference between American and British constitutionalism. 
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support for the subject's right to arms66 supplies an important addition to a 
too-long-neglected c hapter in English intellectual and legal history. 
Undoubtedly the most important of the eighteenth-century jurists and 
commentators to discuss the right to arms was William Blackstone. B lackstone 
discussed the right to arms as one of the five auxiliary rights of the subject. 
Some modern advocates of the collective rights theory have tried to argue that 
because Blackstone listed the right to arms as an auxiliary right, the right was 
somehow seen as a lesser right.67 In one sense, this is a correct reading, but 
further exploration of Blackstone's text reveals that he did not regard the right 
to arms as a right of minor importance. Blackstone's primary rights (personal 
security, personal l iberty, and private property) were what he considered the 
inherent rights of Englishmen. But Blackstone also believed that these rights, 
if they were to have any effect, had to be protected by constitutional 
mechanisms. In his view, these mechanisms consisted of five auxiliary rights: 
1 .  The constitution, powers, and privileges of parliament . . . .  
2.  The limitation of the king's prerogative . . . .  
3 .  A Third S ubordinate right o f  every Englishman is that o f  applying 
to the courts of justice for redress of injuries. 
4. If there should happen any uncommon i njury, or infringement of 
the rights beforementioned, �hich th� ordinary course of_ 
law is . too defective to reach, there still remams a fourth subordmate nght 
appertaining to every individual, namely the right of pe�itioning the 
king or either house of parliament, for the redress of grievances. 
• 
h " d fi  68 5.  The fifth . . .  is  that of having arms for t eir e ence . . . .  
Far from being inferior rights, in the practical constitutional sense, 
Blackstone understood these auxiliary rights as the mechanisms that protected 
the subjects· natural or i nherent rights. Thus, taking Blackstone at his st�ted 
meaning, one would no more deem the right to arms as one of mmor 
importance because it is  listed as an auxiliary right than one would �ee� 
unimportant the right to petition the courts, the legislature, or the sovereign. 
Ironically, the growth of the pro-arms ideology, as �efiecte� �y �lackstone 
and other commentators, was accompanied by decreas��g. �art1c1p�t1on of the 
· · 
th · 1 ·t ·  at large 70 Despite the m1htia s declme, strong population m e m1 I 1a · 
. . . 689 D claration of Rights did not specifically overturn 66. As Malcolm notes, the prov1s1�n tn the If e 
It xpressed a principle and was certainly meant previous statutes restricting the owners?1p or .useb�l't
an;is.dis:rm Protestant subjects. But it was legislative to bind William and �� and t� restnct. their a \I �i ohteenth century, that made the right � robust re�lity action and judicial dec1s1ons, p�cularly m .the _ear 
Y . � of how the courts provided narrow mterpret�t1ons in English life. Of special value is Malcolm s d1sc
h
uss1o
h uld not 
be construed as barring the simple d th restrictive statutes so t at t ey wo of game laws an o er K 0 BEAR ARMS supra note 2, at 1 28-34. ownership of firearms. See To EEP AN ' 
67 S g Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 2 1 ,  at JO. 
68: I e�L:C�STONE, supra note 1 ,  at * 1 36-39. 
69. Id. at 1 36. 
33 70. To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS, supra note 2, at I . 
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support remained for permitting Protestants the right to arms based on an 
understanding that this right was part of the "ancient rights of Englishmen."71 
This English heritage-which mixed arms and rights, militias and duties, 
and fears of standing armies-migrated across the Atlantic. It did so in stages, 
but the American experience in some respects was quite different from the 
parallel English history. Although by the early seventeenth century the ability 
of the English to rely on popular militias had become increasingly tenuous, this 
was not the case in the frontier settlements of colonial America. Beset by 
internal and external threats, early American settlements had very active 
militias. 72 Settlements made considerable efforts to ensure the migration of 
white men capable of bearing arms.73 The survival of colonies, particularly 
in their early stages, rested on virtually74 universal militia participation. 
A mericans entered the eighteenth century conditioned by the English 
heritage of a population armed for the common defense, but also altered by 
their unique American experience. The seventeenth-century experience in 
frontier America had revitalized the concept of the militia at large, and had 
demonstrated the need for private arms as a means of self-defense. The 
seventeenth-century experience also altered views about law, arms, and classes 
of citizens. For the white population, class and religious distinctions, and even 
distinctions between English and non-English, became decreasingly important. 
The entire white population had to be enlisted to counter threats posed by the 
Indian population, the enslaved black population, as well as hostile European 
powers.75 Also, the abundant resources of the new continent ensured that 
game laws such as Charles H's statute of 1 67 1, which helped disarm large 
numbers of common people in England, would not play a significant role in 
early American life. Seventeenth-century American experience considerably 
strengthened the colonies' transplanted English tradition of an armed 
population. 
There would also be a comparable shift in thinking about arms. As was the 
case in England by the eighteenth century, the duty to have arms for the 
common defense became increasingly conceived of as a right. This sentiment 
would intensify by mid-century as differences with England grew and 
Whiggish Americans increasingly perceived themselves to be the true heirs of 
the Revolution of 1689 and the conservators of "the rights of Englishmen."76 
7 1 .  Id. 
72. For an argument that to a considerable degree the militia was needed for racial control, see Cottrol 
& Diamond, supra note 6, at 323-27. 
73. Id. 
74. In most colonies, militia membership was restricted to white men. As a practical matter, every 
colony had free blacks, and occasionally slaves, who would participate in the colony's defense when it was 
under attack. Id. 
75. Id. 
76. BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1 84-89 1 93-94 
( 1 99�). John �hillip Reid �as given us an especially important reminder of the influence of the I 7th-century 
English experience on attitudes towards arms and standing armies: "There are other dimensions that the 
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In the final chapter, Malcolm makes a highly persuasive case that the Militia 
Clause of the Second Amendment, at the time of its drafting and immediately 
thereafter, was widely understood to be advisory and cautionary, an expression 
of preference for the militia over a standing army.77 The second clause was 
even better understood: It was a broad grant of an individual right.78 
Malcolm's afterword traces the ultimate evisceration of the right to arms 
in the United Kingdom. Although British law and sentiment continued to 
recognize the right to arms into the early twentieth century, the aftermath of 
World War I brought with it restrictive gun control statutes that have increased 
in severity as the twentieth century has unfolded. 79 Of course, the right has 
come under severe attack in the United States as well, especially since the 
1960's-often with considerably less intellectual honesty than in the United 
Kingdom.80 
Among its other strengths, To Keep and Bear Arms is a meticulously 
researched work in political and legal history. Whether unraveling the often­
tangled strands of seventeenth-century English politics, showing how interest, 
ideology, and sometimes sheer happenstance helped to transform a duty into 
a right, or explaining the difference between the law of arms as formally stated 
and the actual practice of jurists and juries, Malcolm demonstrates a keen 
sensitivity to both historical process and the role of historical actors in 
producing change. Her study illuminates an often wrongfully neglected chapter 
in the constitutional and ideological histories of two nations. Through her study 
of the right to arms, Malcolm also raises critical questions about the 
relationship between custom and constitutional norm, and the extent to which 
rights are produced not only through formal constitutional processes but also 
through a people's social history. 
How might a consideration of social history augment the essentially legal 
and political history of the development of the right to arms in seventeenth-
standing-army controversy, when studied from the perspective of law, adds to our knowledge of the 
American Revolution. One is the degree to which eighteenth-century Americans thought seventeenth-century 
English thoughts." JOHN P. REID, IN DEFIANCE OF THE LAW 4 ( 1981)  (emphasis added). 
77. To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS, supra note 2, at 1 63-64. 
78. Id. at 162. 
79. Id. at 1 65-77; see also DAVID B. KOPEL, THE SAMURAI, THE MOUNTIE, AND THE COWBOY: 
SHOULD AMERICA ADOPT THE GUN CONTROLS OF OTHER DEMOCRACIES? 71-74 (1 992). 
80. Malcolm notes that Parliament, spurred by fears of disaffected World War I veterans, Irish 
revolutionaries, and Bolshevism, debated arms control i n  1 920. Advocates of stricter arms control, unlike 
many of their present-day American counterparts, forthrightly acknowledged that the right to arms was part 
of existing constitutionalism. They argued, nonetheless, that it was obsolete and should be discarded. To 
KEEP AND BEAR ARMS, supra note 2, at 175. 
Undoubtedly, one reason that British supporters of stricter gun control were able to acknowledge the 
existence of the right to anns as a constitutional principle while their American counterparts have not is 
the different nature of the two constitutional regimes. While acknowledging that the 1 689 Declaration of 
Rights indeed included a right to arms would not prevent contrary legislation by Parliament, a similar 
acknowledgment concerning the Second Amendment would pose real difficulties for gun control advocates 
because, presumably, it would set a limit beyond which Congress could not go absent constitutional 
amendment. 
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century England? It might shed yet further light on England's transformation 
from a society that imposed a duty on the subject to be armed to one that 
formally proclaimed the right of the subject to have arms. The formal 
constitutional story is clear enough. Before 1 689, there was no stated 
recognition of a right to arms. That year, the right was officially recognized 
in the Declaration of Rights. And yet, why is it that the opponents of 
Charles II and James II could get strong agreement that the Stuart Kings were 
attempting to infringe an "ancient[] and indubitable" right of Englishmen, 81 
even though that right had not previously been formally expressed? 
Part of the answer lies in the legal and political history ably related in 
Malcolm's study. Another part of the answer lies in a cultural and social 
history that Malcolm's study points us towards. Briefly stated, the English 
tradition of arms created its own set of cultural dynamics. An armed 
population, and one to whom a considerable portion of the society's defense 
is entrusted, constrains the power of the state in a number of significant ways. 
The most obvious of these, and one that traditionally has been a part of the 
discourse on arms and rights, is that an armed population makes state 
oppression more difficult and makes citizen resistance, even rebellion, more 
possible. More relevant, from the point of view of the English in the 
seventeenth century, is that a government largely dependent for its security on 
its armed population is greatly constrained in its actions. While professional 
police forces and armies can readily be enlisted to enforce unpopular laws or 
to punish popular lawbreakers, mobilizing the population at large for such 
endeavors is more problematic.82 The English thus were accustomed to a 
government whose use of force, whether ordered by the county sheriff, or 
indeed the monarch, was circumscribed by the need to get the consensus of the 
ordinary people who responded to the hue and cry, or constituted the 
militias. 83 
8 1 .  English Declaration of Rights, I W. & M., sess. 2, ch. 2 ( 1689) (Eng.). 
82. For details on the unpopularity of mandatory militia service, see general ly id. at 4-5. 
83. A very strong parallel can be drawn between the English use of the population at large to secure 
the physical safety of the society and the use of the jury to decide the outcomes of trials.  Just as community 
sentiment constrained the sheriff's physical ability to enforce the law, popular sentiment in the fonn of the 
jury limited the ability of the Crown and the courts to convict criminal defendants. It is probably no 
accident that a fonnal recognition of this power of the jury came during the Restoration in 1671 with Chief 
Justice Vaughan's opinion in Bushell's Case, I Vaughan 135, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P. 1670). For a useful 
overview of the development of the jury's role, see THOMAS A. GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDING TO 
CONSCIENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON THE ENGLISH CRIMINAL TRIAL JURY 1200-1800 (1985) . 
. On� also co�ld argue that the same distrust of popular power that has weakened the prerogatives of the JUry m Amencan law has also served to erode the right to bear arms and the notion of uni versal 
participation in the defense of the community. In both cases, the growth of professions-the legal 
profession in the case of juries, and the military and police in the case of posses and militias-with vested 
interests �n truncating c�mmunity pa�i�ip�tion helped weaken the role of the population at large in 
safeguardmg the community or determmmg its legal standards. For a good discussion of the erosion of the 
American jury's powers, see general ly Albert W. Alschulcr & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the 
Criminal Jury in the United States, 6 1  U. CHI. L. REV. 867 ( 1994). . 
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Although the traditional link between the role of private arms and the 
preservation of an  English society less oppressive than its continental 
contemporaries84 has escaped formal discussion by jurists and other legal 
commentators, distrust of armed professionals and belief in the importance of 
private arms as a means of self-defense had long pedigrees in English society 
and culture. 85 The importance of this traditional culture of arms to the 
ultimate constitutionalization of the right to arms at the end of the seventeenth 
century cannot be underestimated. Certainly by the sixteenth century, if not 
long before, English belief in the superiority of their institution s  and customs 
as compared with those of the rest of Europe was pronounced. S purred on by 
English difference-the early adoption o f  a variant of Protestantism in contrast 
to the Catholic dominance of much of the continent, a relatively limited 
government, a relative respect for individual liberty-Englishmen came to 
contrast what they saw as the happy condition of their kingdom with less­
enlightened conditions elsewhere.86 English custom was seen as not simply 
superior, but indeed as somehow more accurately reflecting the natural order. 
This was not simply a popular view, but indeed one that came to be the view 
84. See G.M. TREVELYAN, ENGLISH SOCIAL HISTORY 1 66--67 ( 1 942). 
85. The Magna Charta indicated an eariy English d istaste for standing armies. Article XLI stated 
"(t]hat the King shall remove all Foreign Knights, Stipendiaries, Crossbowmen, lnfringers, and Servitors 
who came with horses and arms to the injury of the kingdom." RICHARD THOMSON, AN HISTORICAL EsSAY 
ON THE MAGNA CHARTA OF KING JOHN 57 (London, Johnson 1 829). Without indulging in too much 
speculation, one might draw some interesting parallels with regard to the right to arms between the granting 
of the Magna Charta, the announcement of the English Declaration of Rights of 1 689; and the creation of 
the U.S. Bill of Rights of 1 79 1 . All three documents, which express limitations on governmental power and 
set forth individual rights, were the products of insurrections by armed populations. The role of private 
arms in bringing about the new constitutional order was the subject of an extensive celebratory literature. 
The Robin Hood legend, describing the rebellions against King John, is the most prominent of these; and, 
of course, the Minutemen at Lexington and Concord retain a mythic value for most Americans to the 
present day. In a similar vein, it is probably not coincidental that the modern nation with one of the 
strongest traditions of an armed citizenry and a universal militia, Switzerland, is a nation whose founding 
myth, the story of William Tell ,  involves armed rebellion against a foreign tyranny. These are the kind of 
foundations on which a folk culture linking private arms and individual l iberty are likely to pen;ist 
regardless of the state of legal commentary. 
The link between possession of arms and freedom and full membership in the community appears 
to have been a long-standing part of Germanic culture, from which English culture was partly derived. 
Sociologist Orlando Patterson notes that in England and other Germanic cultures, the freeing of slaves 
generally was accompanied by presenting the former slave with his own arms. ORLANDO PATTERSON, 
SLAVERY AND SOCIAL DEATii 2 1 7-18  (1 982). 
86. This sentiment was perhaps best captured by Gaunt in Richard the Second: 
This royal throne of kings, this sceptered isle, 
This earth of majesty, this seat of Mars, 
This other Eden, demi-paradise, 
This fortress built by Nature for herself, 
Against infection and the hand of war, 
This happy breed of men, this little world, 
This precious stone set i n  the silver sea, 
Which serves it in the office of a wall, 
Or as a moat defensive to a house 
Against the envy of less happier lands; 
This blessed plot, this earth, this realm, this England . . . .  
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, RICHARD THE SECOND act 2, SC. 1 .  
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of English jurists who saw English custom, as reflected in the common law, 
as embodying immutable principles of natural law.87 
Thus, in important ways, the Stuart attempts to limit the right to arms ran 
counter to strong cultural traditions, traditions that distinguished English 
society from the societies of continental Europe. At a time when English 
custom was taken as a reflection of the natural order, it was not hard to 
convince the drafters of the Declaration of Rights that an "ancient[] and 
indubitable" right had been encroached by James II. In this sense, Malcolm's 
book furnishes us with an important reminder that constitutional sensibilities 
are shaped not only by the elite cultures of jurists and legal commentators but 
by prevailing custom and folk tradition as well. 
III. CUSTOMARY NEGLECT AND CULTURAL DESUETUDE: 
THE WANING OF A CONSTITUTIONAL CONSENSUS 
If the robust English tradition of the community at arms helped shape the 
constitutional sensibilities that led to the formal recognition of the right to arms 
in 1 689, subsequent developments would ultimately shift the notion of a right 
to arms from near the center of British constitutional thinking to the far 
periphery. That transformation in attitude, occurring over centuries, represented 
more than a shift in sentiments on the part of legislators, jurists, and legal 
theorists. It also reflected a decreasing English experience with the resort to 
private arms for community, or even personal, defense in the centuries 
following the Declaration of Rights. As such, the English experience with arms 
and rights raises important questions that go beyond the question of private 
arms and constitutionalism. The erosion of the English right to arms and its 
ultimate evisceration in the twentieth century illustrate the difficulty of 
maintaining a right solely through theoretical abstraction in the face of 
widespread disuse. 
A. Before the Fall: Public Safety and the Security of Rights-A Resolution 
The nineteenth century would begin with apparent continued agreement 
that the right to arms played a critical role in securing the liberties of the 
English subject. Certainly the English experience in the eighteenth century 
enhanced the ideology of arms, rights, and freedom proclaimed in the 1 689 
87. Undoubtedly the strongest expression of the view that common law embodied natural law was Sir 
Edward Coke's opinion in 1 6 10  in Dr. Bonham 's Case. In that case, Coke expressed the view that common 
law
. 
pr!ndples �ven controlled acts of Parliament, making contrary acts void. Although this early notion 
of JUdtctal review would not be adopted by English jurists, it clearly had an important influence on 
American jurisprudence. Dr. Bonham's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 652 (C.P. 1 6 10); see also STEPHEN D. 
WHITE, SIR EDWARD COKE AND "THE GRIEVANCES OF THE COMMONWEALTH," 162 1 - 1 628, at 1 5-16 
( 1979); Plucknett, supra note 65. 
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Declaration and reiterated a century later in the American Bill of Rights. 
Blackstone's writings would highlight the issue for lawyers and jurists on both 
sides of the Atlantic. And although the concept of the universal militia 
increasingly gave way to the efficiencies of more selectively trained units,88 
political observers in the eighteenth century still accepted the notion that the 
right to arms and the preservation •of political freedom were inextricably 
linked. For example, Swiss constitutional commentator Jean DeLolme, author 
of the 1775 classic, The Constitution of England,89 perceived that the key to 
the preservation of rights in England was the right to resist governmental 
tyranny.90 He suggested that this right of resistance should be seen not only 
in rights such as freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and freedom to 
petition government for redress of grievances, but also in the right of the 
English to be "provided with arms for their own defence."91 DeLolme saw 
this right as a deterrent, establishing a hedge against governmental tyranny: 
"The power of the people is not when they strike, but when they keep in awe: 
it is when they can overthrow everything, that they never need to 
move . . . .  "92 
Social conditions reinforced this Whiggish celebration of the armed 
population. The widespread violence of eighteenth-century England, a 
condition that would persist well into the next century,93 made the ownership 
and use of arms necessary for much of the English population. Professional 
police forces would not begin to take over the task of law enforcement from 
the citizenry at large until the first decades of the nineteenth century.94 
Although eighteenth-century legal commentators and political philosophers 
extolled the virtues of the armed population with one eye on the excesses of 
the seventeenth-century Stuarts, the average subject had more immediate 
concerns-the need for arms to fend off common criminals. In an important 
88. Hardy, Historiography, supra note 16, at 24-27. 
89. JEAN DELOLME, THE CONSTITUTION OF ENGLAND (John MacGregor ed., London, J. Cuthell 1853) 
(1 775). Jean DeLolme arrived in England in 1 765 as Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England 
appeared, and ten years later produced The Constitution of England, a work of such significance that 
Disraeli would later praise DeLolme as "England's Montesquieu." To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS, supra note 
2, at 1 66. 
90. To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS, supra note 2, at 1 66. 
9 1 .  DELOLME, supra note 89, at 2 1 5; see also To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS, supra note 2, at 1 66. The 
right to resistance was not merely abstract, but of true consequence. Resistance to arbitrary power, DeLolme 
pointed out, "gave birth to the Great Charter," DELOLME, supra note 89, at 214, and had as well accounted 
for the overthrow of James II, id. at 2 1 5. Thus, not only did political theory prescribe, but experience had 
taught, that "resistance is . . .  the ultimate and lawful resource against the violences of power." Id. at 214. 
92. DELOLME, supra note 89, at 219; see also To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS, supra note 2, at 1 66. 
93. See J.M. BEATTI E, CRIME AND THE COURTS JN ENGLAND, 1 660-1 800, at 36-37, 252-64 ( 1 986). 
For a collection that provides vivid portraits of crime and punishment in I 8th-century England, see 
DO UGLAS HAY ET AL., AL BION'S FATAL TREE: CRIME AND SOCIETY IN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND 
( 1 975). 
94. See TREVELYAN, supra note 84, at 230, 482; R.K. WEBB, MODERN ENGLAND: FROM THE 1 8TH 
CENTURY TO THE PRESENT 1 84-85 ( 1 970). 
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sense, however, the two sets of concerns reinforced each other, sustaining a 
consensus on the right to arms. 
The importance ascribed to the right to arms can be seen in Malcolm's 
description of the passage and aftermath of the 1820 Seizure of Arms Act.95 
The French revolutionary wars had been followed by a decline in real wages 
for workers in England, and social unrest, including riots in industrial districts, 
ensued. Fears for public safety reached crisis levels after August 1 8 19, when, 
at St. Peter's Fields in Manchester, a peaceful crowd protesting increased bread 
prices and demanding reform of Parliament was fired upon. Twelve people 
were killed and hundreds injured. In November 1 81 9, another crowd gathered 
near Burnley to protest the Manchester killings and discuss parliamentary 
reform. A confrontation with soldiers ensued; many in the crowd drew 
concealed weapons, including pikeheads and pistols.96 
In the end, the crowd dispersed without injury, but not without further 
consequence. Several of the organizers were arrested and six were convicted 
of causing people to go armed to a public meeting. In his summation of the 
case to the jury, the trial judge cited the English Declaration of Rights in 
asking, given the right of Protestant English to "Arms for their Defence 
suitable to their Conditions, and as allowed by Law," whether the weapons in 
question were "suitable to the condition of people in the ordinary class of life, 
and are they allowed by law?" The judge registered his discomfort with the 
idea that carrying arms was a mechanism for controlling government excess, 
but he recognized that "a man has a clear right to arms to protect himself in 
his house . . .  [and] to protect himself when he is going singly or in a small 
party upon the road where he is travelling or going for the ordinary purposes 
of business," including the purpose of attending a public meeting, except "to 
create terror and alarm."97 Thus, while still confirming the underlying utility 
and legitimacy of the right to bear arms as an instrument of self-defense, the 
trial judge reserved judgment on Blackstone's statement of the right to arms 
as a hedge against tyranny and held the door open for the jury to find the 
defendants guilty. 
Parliament responded to the Manchester and Burnley riots by passing the 
Seizure of Arms Act. 98 Adopting the rationale provided by the trial judge in 
the Burnley riot case, the Act authorized search warrants allowing constables 
in specified troubled industrial areas to search for and seize weapons kept "for 
a purpose dangerous to the Public Peace."99 In view of the seemingly 
95. Seizure of Arms Act, I Geo. 4, ch. 2 ( 1 820) (Eng.); see also To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS, supra 
note 2, at 168--69 (discussing passage and aftermath of Seizure of Arms Act). 
96. See To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS, supra note 2, at 1 66-67. 
97. Id. at 168 (citation omitted). The fact that one anticipates an attack by the police is no excuse for 
carrying a weapon if one's underlying reason for carrying the weapon is to cause terror and alarm. 
98. Id. 
99. Seizure of Arms Act, 1 Geo. 4, ch. 2 ( 1 820) (Eng.). 
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imminent soc ial upheaval , support for this legislation would have been 
certainly understandable. Yet , as Malcolm points out , the opponents in 
Parliament to this legislation vigorously argued that the measure violated the 
right to bear arms-the right to defend oneself and one's family and 
property.100 Even the government's spokesman, Lord Castlereagh, conceded 
this, but argued that a situation of public necessity demanded the constitutional 
. h be . d IOI p l" ng t compromise . ar iament agreed, but the Seizure Act was not 
renewed upon its expiration two years later. 
One of the c entral ironies concerning the right to arms emerged in the 
events surrounding the Seizure of Arms Act. Clearly, the legislation 
compromised the right to arms. And although both Parliament and courts 
remained willing to support the possession of arms for personal self-defense, 
they demonstrated a clear reluctance to uphold the political d imension of a 
right to arms: maintaining an armed population as a deterrent to potential 
governmental misconduct. This history demonstrates an inherent diff iculty in 
the right to arms as a constitutional notion. Ultimately , to have legal meaning, 
constitutional r ights must be safeguarded by legislatures or courts. It fairly can 
be said that legislators and jurists are fundamentally conservative, regardless 
of their stands on the issues of the day and regardless of where they are 
located on contemporary political and ideological spectrums. Can individuals 
who have r isen to the top of a society's political apparatus be trusted, in the 
long run, to safeguard the right to arms, the popular means of r esisting that 
apparatus? Or does the continuing viability of such a right, like its origins, owe 
more to custom and tradition than to constitutional theory? The experience in 
nineteenth-century Great Britain suggests the latter. The British experience in 
the twentieth century and the divergent paths taken by the United Kingdom 
and the United States in the twentieth c entury provide vivid reminders of the 
importance of custom in maintaining constitutional traditions. 
· 100. To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS, supra note 2, at 1 69. George Bennet spoke with perhaps a bit of 
hyperbole when he remarked that "the distinctive difference between a freeman and a slave was a right to 
possess arms; not so much, as had been stated, for the purpose of defending his property as his liberty." 
41 T.C. HANSARD, THE PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES FROM THE YEAR 1 803 TO THE PRESENT TIME 1 130-31 
( 1 819), quoted in To KEEP AND l3EAR ARMS, supra note 2, at 1 69. 
101 .  Lord Castlereagh admitted '"that the principle of the bill was not congenial with the constitution, 
that it was an infringement upon the rights and duties of the people, and that it could only be defended 
upon the necessity of the case."' To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS, supra note 2, at 169 (quoting 4 1  HANSARD, 
supra note 100, at 1 1 6). Thus he argued, "some restrictive measures were necessary to preserve the 
tranquility of the country." HANSARD, supra note I 00, at 1 1 32-33. Others who argued for the bill 
pronounced the Seizure Act. consistent with the right to arms, as "'recogniz[ing] the right of the subject 
to have arms. but qualif[ying] that right in such a manner as the necessit[ies] of the case require[d]."' To 
KEEP AND BEAR ARMS, supra note 2, at 221 11.25 (quoting HANSARD, supra note 1 00, at 1 1 62 (remarks 
of George Canning)). 
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B. Fall from Grace: Twentieth-Century British Regulation of A rms 
The twentieth-century history of the right to arms began inauspiciously 
enough. The only significant firearms statute that would survive the nineteenth 
century was the 1 870 Gun License Act, 102 and until 1903 it remained 
Britain's only important firearms statute. 1 03 But even the Gun License Act 
served primarily as a revenue measure, requiring those who wished to carry a 
firearm outside the home to pay a nominal tax of ten shillings. I04 The House 
of Commons rejected stringent handgun control legislation in 1 893 and 
1 895. 105 As the twentieth century opened, the right to bear arms remained 
secure. Gun control legislation would pass in 1 903, but it merely prohibited 
sales to minors and felons, and little more. 1 06 
In 1920, however, Parliament passed "a comprehensive arms control 
measure that effectively repealed the right to be armed by requiring a firearm 
certificate for anyone wishing to 'purchase, possess, use or carry any 
description of firearm or ammunition for the weapon. "'107 Only those who 
could demonstrate to the local chief of police a "good reason for requiring 
such a certificate"1 08 could obtain a certificate or license, and a local chief 
could reject anyone "of intemperate habits, unsound mind, or 'for any reason 
unfitted to be trusted with firearms. "' I09 Malcolm maintain s  that the 
incidence of armed crime was low in Britain at this time, and that the 
prevalence of guns in society was not related to crime. Thus, she argues that 
political reasons, not fear of violent crime, provided the primary impetus for 
the 1 920 legislation . 1 10 This is certainly the case. Parliament was concerned 
that demobilization had brought back from the Great War thousands of soldiers 
trained in arms, desensitized by combat, and disillusioned by the years and 
lives lost in a seemingly senseless conflict. 1 1 1  Russia's participation in the 
war had been followed by a revolution that swept the czar, the nobility, and 
1 02 .  Gun License Act, 1 870, 33 & 34 Viet., ch. 57 (Eng.). 
I 03. To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS, supra note 2, at 1 70. Restrictions on the right to arms were relatively 
minor until the 20th century. See also COLIN GREENWOOD, FIREARMS CONTROL: A STUDY OF ARMED 
CRIME AND FIREARMS CONTROL IN ENGLAND AND WALES 25 ( 1 972). 
I 04. To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS, supra note 2, at 1 70. 
1 05 .  Id. 
I 06. The Pistols Act of 1 903, 3 Edw. 7, ch. J 8 (Eng.).  
1 07 .  To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS, supra note 2, at 170 (quoti ng Firearms Act, 1 920, JO & 1 1  Geo. 5, 
ch. 43 (Eng.)). 
1 08. Firearms Act, 1 920, I O  & 1 1  Geo. 5, ch. 43 (Eng.). 
1 09. To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS, supra note 2, at 1 70 (quoting Firearms Act, 1 920, IO & 1 1  Geo. 5, 
ch. 43 (�ng.)). 
1 1 0 .  Id. at 1 7 1 ,  173. 
1 1 1 .  Unquestionably, since the War, there are far more people in this and every other 
country than there were before the War, who not only know how to use firearms, 
but who, as t�e res�lt of their War experience, and of the small value necessarily 
placed upon hfe dunng the War, are prepared to use those firearms against the State 
and its officers. 
1 30 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 663 ( 1 920) (remarks of Edward Winterton, M.P.). 
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the monied clas s  from power and eventually put Communists in control of 
government. At home, the Communist Party was being organized, along with 
the Trades Union Congress; Ireland, which would win its freedom in 1921 , 
was as yet "in a state of virtual civil war. "1 12 
Facing desperate times, the British government decided on a radical 
measure. In 1 9 1 8 , the B ritish Home Office had drafted a secret memorandum 
proposing that firearms control measures be adopted before demobilization of 
the troops at the end of the war, so that the arms carried by soldiers would not 
be dispersed throughout the country. 1 1 3 The memorandum's drafters warned 
the Cabinet that the measure would be controversial. 1 1 4 Although the 
proposal remained secret until after Britain's armistice with Germany in 1918 , 
by 1 920 both the Cabinet and Parliament decided to move for the bill's 
passage. 
Malcolm emphasizes that the tenor of the debate over the 1 920 Act 
exposed a sea change in attitudes toward the right to bear arms. Only one 
member of Parliament argued in favor of self-defense as a reason to vote 
against the bill 1 1 5-and he nevertheless voted in favor of its passage. 1 1 6 
And though members questioned the propriety of allowing the police to 
determine who would hold arms in the country, 1 1 7 they dismissed the 
argument suggesting that the right to arms was of utility as a hedge against 
governmental tyranny. 
Even this argument's ardent proponent, Lieutenant-Commander Joseph 
Kenworthy-who suggested that it had been "'a well-know n  object of the 
Central Government in this country to deprive people of their weapons' "-did 
not think that the right to arms was a necessary means of keeping the 
government in check: 
"I do not know whether this Bill is  aimed at any such goal as that 
but, if so, I would point out to the right hon [orable] Gentleman that 
if he deprives private citizens in this country of every sort of weapon 
they could possibly use, he will not have deprived them of their 
power, because the great weapon of democracy to-day is not the 
halberd or the sword or firearms, but the power of withholding their 
labour. I am sure that the power of withholding his labour is  one of 
1 1 2. To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS, supra note 2, at 1 7 1 -72. 
I 13. Id. at 1 72, 222 n.45. 
1 14. Id. at 172. 
1 1 5. Id. at 173. 
1 1 6. John Jameson thought that '"for very many peaceful, law-abiding people it is a necessity of life 
almost that, if they are to remain in life, they shall have firearms with which to defend themselves against 
murderers and rebels."' Id. (quoting 133 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 86 (1920)). Only because permits were 
available that would give individuals "a chance of defending themselves" could Jameson vote for the bill. 
1 33 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 86 ( 1920). 
1 1 7. See the remarks of Lieutenant-Commander Joseph Kenworthy, who preferred such powers to be 
in the hands of a magistrate. To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS, supra note 2, at 1 74 (quoting 1 30 PARL. DEB., 
H.C. (5th ser.) 659 ( 1 920)). 
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which certain Members of our Execucive would very much l ike lo 
deprive him. But it is our last line of defence againsl tyranny. " l l M  
This lukewarm support for the political dimension of lhe righl l o  arms 
drew vehement disagreement: 
"[ Kenworthy 's] idea is that the State is an aggressive body, which is 
endeavouring to deprive the private individual of the weapons which 
Heaven has given into his hands to fight against the State . . .  ( . )  
Holding those views, and believing that it is desirable or legitimate or 
justifiable for private individuals to arm themselves, with . . . ( . I  the 
ultimate intention of using their arms against the forces of the State, 
he objects to this Bill.  There are other people who hold those views 
in this country, and it is because of the existence of people of that 
type that the Government has introduced this Bill ." 1 19 
Indeed, another member countered that the right to arms was an 
anachronism, arguing that there would be " 'nothing more dangerous at the 
present time, or indeed at any time, than to lead the people of the country to 
believe that their method of redress was in the direction of armed resistance 
to the State. "' 1 20 Rather, the proper mode of resistance to governmental 
misconduct-and indeed the only proper way to redress one's grievances-was 
through an appeal to Parliament and the courts. 121  
In the end, the Firearms Control Act passed with little opposition, 254 in 
favor and only 6 against. 122 Refined in 1937 and extended in 1 968 to include 
shotguns, the Act continues in force today. 1 23 The Act, as the debates 
surrounding it demonstrated, certainly represented the waning of the 
constitutional ideology of the right to arms proclaimed in the Declaration of 
1 689 and reiterated by Blackstone in the eighteenth century. British fears of 
foreign-induced radicalism, 124 further fueled by the presence of large 
1 1 8. Id. (quoting 130 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 658 ( 1 920)). Even if Kenworthy thought the right 
to arms not so important as the power of the subjects to withhold their labor, he thought the right of 
resistance of paramount importance: '" [T]he very foundation of the liberty of the subject in this country 
is that he can, if driven to do so, resist, and I hope he will always be able to resist. You can only govern 
with the consent of the people."' Id. (quoting 130 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 663 (1 920)). 
1 1 9. Id. (quoting 1 30 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 662--63 ( 1 920) (remarks of Edward Winterton, 
M.P.)). 
1 20. Id. at 175 (quoting 1 30 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 670 ( 1 920) (remarks of Harry Barnes, M.P.)). 
1 2 1 .  To be sure, Major Harry Barnes correctly identified the powers and privileges of Parliament and 
the rights to petition Parliament and the courts among those five auxiliary rights that guaranteed 
maintenance of the three primary ones. See I BLACKSTONE, supra note 1 ,  at *143-45. In this, however, 
Major Barnes rejected the reasoning of Blackstone that the three primary rights of personal security, 
personal liberty, and private property were meaningless without all jive auxiliary rights he identified. 
Compare id. with TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS, supra note 2, at 1 75 (quotin g  130 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 
67 1 ( 1 920) (remarks of Harry Barnes, M.P.) (arguing that i ncreased access to courts would '"tum [the 
subjects'] attention away from using weapons."')). 
1 22. To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS, supra note 2, at 1 75. 
123. Firearms Act, 1968, ch. 27 (Eng.). 
1 24. To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS, supra note 2, at 171-72. 
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numbers of embittered veterans-still recovering from the trauma of the Great 
War125 and all too familiar with modern weaponry-undoubtedly played a 
significant role in reducing support for what was once deemed an ancient and 
indubitable right .  
But something more seems to have played a role in the willingness of 
Parliament-and apparently the general public-to surrender this portion of the 
English constitutional heritage with so little dissent. The 1920 Act was the 
result not only of a shift in constitutional ideology, but also of a change in the 
sociology of arm s  and arms ownership. If Britons entered the nineteenth 
century owning arms on a widespread basis-reflecting a continued need for 
personal defense, and to a lesser extent, a means of community defense-the 
situation had become quite different by the dawn of the twentieth century. The 
widespread violence and lawlessness of early nineteenth-century Britain had 
been replaced by a considerably less violent, more law-abiding society as 
Britain entered the Edwardian era. 126 During the course of the century, the 
ad hoc posse had given way to professional police forces, 1 27 and citizen 
participation in self- or community defense had become less and less common 
place. 
These developments meant that over t he course of the nineteenth century 
fewer Britons felt the need to own "Arms for their Defence." This was of 
particular significance because it was roughly in the period from the mid-
1 860's until World War I-just when perceived popular needs for self-defense 
· were waning-that modern firearms technology, as we are now familiar with 
it, came into being. 128 The inferential evidence129 suggests that the British 
125. Id. ; see A.J.P. TAYLOR, ENGLISH HISTORY: 1 91 4-1945, at 120 (1 965) (indicating that 1 .5 million 
British soldiers were wounded in World War I). 
126. Ted R. Gurr, On the History of Violent Crime in Europe and America, in VIOLENCE IN AMERICA: 
HISTORICAL & COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 353, 353-56 (Hugh D. Graham & Ted R. Gurr eds., 1979). 
127. To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS, supra note 2, at 1 69. 
128. For references to the history and development of firearms technology, see generally EDWARD C. 
EZELL, SMALL ARMS OF THE WORLD (1983); ROBERT HELD, THE AGE OF FIREARMS: A PICTORAL 
HISTORY (1957); HAROLD L. PETERSON, THE TREASURY OF THE GUN (1962). 
129. Two pieces of evidence suggest that the ownership of modern firearms was not widespread in 
the United Kingdom at the time of the passage of the Firearms Control Act. First, the fact that the Act 
could be passed with virtually no opposition suggests a relatively small constituency of pistol and rifle 
owners. Second, by 1 940, the British government, facing the threat of a possible German invasion after 
Dunkirk, began mobilizing a citizen's militia, or Home Guard. According to David Kopel, a student of 
firearms regulation in cross-national perspective: "The Horne Guard had to drill with canes, umbrellas, 
spears, pikes and clubs. When citizens could find a gun, it was generally a sporti ng shotgun-ill-suited for 
military use because of its short range and bulky ammunition." KOPEL, supra note 79, at 75. The British 
government requested small arms for Home Guard use from private parties in the United States, including 
the National Rifle Association. 
If one were to contemplate a similar situation in the United States, it seems highly unlikely that 
legislation such as the Firearms Control Act would result in such a wholesale disarmament of the civilian 
population. If substantial numbers of gun owners were denied licenses under such an act, there would 
certainly be an observable political reaction. Also, large numbers of firearms owners in the United States 
would probably disobey such a Jaw. In any event, the likelihood that 20 years after the enactment of such 
legislation it would be difficult to equip an American Horne Guard in time of emergency seems highly 
improbable. This discussion suggests that the British firearms-owning population prior to the enactment of 
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public during this critical period did not acquire modern firearms in large 
A . . 1 30 quantities-in marked contrast to the contemporary mencan expenence. 
By the time of the 1 920 Act, arms ownership for defense was an increasingly 
unimportant part of the experience of the average British subject. The 
constitutional change, therefore, essentially ratified already accomplished social 
and cultural developments. 
IV. A CAUTIONARY TALE 
It is in pointing us  to the intersection of legal and social change that Joyce 
Lee Malcolm's To Keep and Bear Arms is at its most important and 
tantalizing. The temptation to use this study to shed light on the contemporary 
American gun control debate is compelling and entirely proper. Certainly 
Malcolm's work sheds further light on the Second Amendment controversy, 
creating even greater difficulty for die-hard adherents of the collective rights 
view of the Amendment. 13 1  If her only contribution were to clarify our 
discussion of the English origins of the right to arms, untangling the 
complexities of the conflicts between the Stuarts and their opponents along the 
way, it  would be a significant one. 
But her work does more. It raises important questions for our time. The 
history of arms and rights has taken a very different turn in the United States 
in the twentieth century than in the United Kingdom, less because of the 
protection afforded by the Second Amendment or analogous provisions in state 
constitutions132 than because of the ubiquity of modern firearms in twentieth­
century American society. 133 The high level of violence in American society 
the legislation was considerably less than what is currently the case in the United States. 
1 30. The role of the Western frontier in fostering gun ownership in late nineteenth-century America 
is well known and has been celebrated in American folklore and popular culture. Although less celebrated, 
racial vi olence, particularly i n  the South, was another major contributor to the maintenance of a widely 
dispersed gun culture in the United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. For a general 
overview of the American gun culture, see LEE KENNETT & JAMES L. ANDERSON, THE GUN IN AMERICA: 
THE ORIGINS OF A NATIONAL DILEMMA ( 1 975); ROGER D. MCGRATH, GUNFIGHTERS, HIGHWAYMEN AND 
VIGILANTES: VIOLENCE ON THE FRONTIER (1984). 
1 3 1 .  Malcolm's work indicates not only that the Framers saw the Second Amendment as protecting 
an individual right against federal infringement, but also that some of the Framers' contemporaries even 
saw the Amendment as protecting against potential state encroachment on the right to arms as well. See 
To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS, supra note 2, at 164. At least one antebellum state case echoed this view. See 
Nunn v. Georgia, 1 Ga. 243 ( 1 846). For an argument that Taney's decision in Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 
U.S. ( 1 9  How.) 393 ( 1 857), may have adopted the view that the Second Amendment constrained state 
action, see Cottrol, supra note 1 8 ,  at xx-xxi. 
It is  interesting in light of this history that the Second Amendment's right to arms is one of the few 
provisions of the Bill of Rights that has not been incorporated. Presser v. Illinois, 1 16 U.S. 252, 265 ( 1 886). 
1 32. Forty-three states have state constitutional provisions protecting the right to arms. See STEPHEN 
P. HALBROOK, A RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS: STATE AND FEDERAL BILLS OF RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
GUARANTEES (1 989). 
1 33. See supra note 20 and accompanying text; see also TASK FORCE ON GUN VIOLENCE, BAR ASS'N 
OF S.F. ET AL., REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 9 ( 1 994) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT] 
(indicating that over 209 million firearms are in private hands in United States). 
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both increases calls for stricter gun control 134 and increases firearms sales 
and resistance to gun control measures. 1 35 A surprisingly large percentage of 
Americans have personal experience with gun violence, either as victims of 
criminal attack1 36 or in the use of guns for self-defense. 1 37 This, of course, 
ensures a continued constituency for a right to arms for defensive purposes in 
late twentieth-century America, a constituency that was largely lacking in 
Britain earlier in the century. 
To Keep and Bear Arms performs yet another service, reminding us of the 
importance of the debate over arms and rights and how, in too many ways, that 
debate has been trivialized. Malcolm's study convincingly demonstrates how 
the right to arms was once considered a vital cornerstone of Anglo-American 
political philosophy and constitutionalism. Today that ancient principle is 
largely defended by a group of hobbyists in the form of the National Rifle 
Association. And while that organization is undoubtedly more decent and 
indeed more perceptive than its over-demonized image might suggest, it is not 
a body to which Americans are accustomed to turning for serious political and 
constitutional c ommentary. 138 Nonetheless, the failure of the academy, 139 
the civil liberties  community, 140 and the legal and intellectual communities 
to engage more seriously the central issue posed by a right to arms is 
disturbing. 
If, as Malcolm's work clearly demonstrates, the right to arms is essentially 
a question of the balance of power between a people and the state that governs 
them, that question is far more important today than when it was first 
formalized in seventeenth-century England. We have, in the twentieth century, 
seen the rise of monstrous states capable of deprivations of liberty far in 
excess of anything that the English Whigs who authored the Declaration of 
Rights of 1 689-or their American successors in 1 791-could have envisioned. 
By a conservative estimate, over sixty million people have been murdered by 
their own governments in this century. 141 Mass murder of defenseless 
134. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 133, at 1 0. 
135. See, e.g., Federal Licensing Procedures for Importing and Selling Firearms: Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Federal Services, Post Office, and Civil Service of the Senate Comm. on Governmental 
Affairs, I 03d Cong., 2 d  Sess. 32 (1 994) (statement of Richard Gardner). 
136. Sociologist Gary Kleck reports that in 1985 there were 650,000 crimes involving guns. KLECK, 
supra note 19, at 44. 
1 37. Kleck reports that survey research data indicate between 600,000 to 900,000 civilians use firearms 
for defense against crime each year. Id. at 1 06--07. 
138. We tend to agree with William Van Alstyne's observation concerning Americans' virtual 
abandonment of serious consideration of and advocacy for Second Amendment rights to the NRA: "[T]hat 
it has taken the NRA to speak for them, with respect to the Second Amendment, moreover, is merely 
interesting-perhaps far more as a comment on others, however, than on the NRA." Van Alstyne, supra 
note 6. at 1254-55. 
139. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
140. See Van Alstyne, supra note 6, at 1244 & n.24. 
141. Sixty million is an extremely conservative figure. Some recent remarks by Assistant Secretary 
of State for Human Rights John Shattuck hint at the extent of government sponsored mass murder in this 
century: "In the twentieth century the number of people killed by their own governments under 
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civilians has occurred in the heart of Europe in Hitler's Third Reich; across the 
breadth of Asia in Stalin's Soviet Union; in Mao's China, the world 's most 
populous country ; as well as in Pol Pot's Cambodia and the African nation of 
Rwanda, to name but a few. Nor do we lack American exam ples of how 
popular defenselessness and a state monopoly of force can threaten freedom 
and indeed life itself. That, in the light of the history of the twentieth century, 
those we rely on for serious constitutional and political commentary have 
failed to examine the issues of whether the state should have a monopoly of 
force and whether a n  armed population might still play an important role in 
deterring governmental excesses bespeaks a dangerous intellectual cowardice, 
a self-imposed limit on political and constitutional discourse that causes us 
largely to ignore one of the most critical questions of our time. 
By tracing these questions to a time when they were first articulated in the 
modern era, Malcolm has performed an invaluable service in expanding the 
boundaries of the contemporary debate. She has shown that history can speak 
clearly to contemporary constitutional issues, not only by shedding light on the 
always-vexing issue of original intent, but also by showing, in the case of arms 
and rights, that the concerns that led to the constitutionalization of the right to 
arms were not simply the transitory concerns of one historical moment, but 
instead were vital issues with a long and enduring legacy. 
authoritarian regimes is four times the number killed in all this century's wars combined." John Shattuck, 
Remarks at the Women's National Democratic Club (Sept. 1 2, 1 993), available in LEXIS, News Library, 
Fednew File (emphasis added). 
If Shattuck's calculations are correct, they indicate that over 100 million individuals have been murdered 
by their own governments in this century. The casualty figures for World Wars I and II alone exceeded 25 
million. See ROBERT R. PALMER & JOEL COLTON, A HISTORY OF THE MODERN WORLD 841 (3d ed. 1 965). 
